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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
T h i s i s an a p p e a l t a k e n f rom t h e f i n a l o r d e r o r d e n i a l 
of A p p e l l a n t ' s M o t i o n t o W i t h d r a w G u i l t y P l e a t o t h e c h a r g e of 
C r i m i n a l Homic ide , Murder in t h e Second Degree , by t h e Honorab le 
Frank G. Noe l , Judge of t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t . 
The U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s o r i g i n a l A p p e l l a n t ' s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o A r t i c l e V I I I , S e c t i o n 3 of t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n of U tah and § 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) , U tah Code Ann. 
( 1 9 5 3 , as amended) . 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did t h e l o w e r C o u r t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g 
D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o W i t h d r a w h i s g u i l t y p l e a t o C r i m i n a l 
Homic ide , Murder in t h e Second D e g r e e . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A p p e l l a n t was c h a r g e d by I n f o r m a t i o n d a t e d Sep tember 19 , 
1993 w i t h " C r i m i n a l H o m i c i d e , Murder , Second Degree" , in v i o l a t i o n 
of bo th s u b p a r a g r a p h (a) and s u b p a r a g r a p h (b) of T i t l e 76, Chap te r 
5, S e c t i o n 203 (1 ) , Utah Code Ann. (1953 , a s amended) , in t h e d e a t h 
of A p p e l l a n t ' s w i f e , E l v i a B o r e n . ( R . l l ) A p p e l l a n t r e c e i v e d a 
c o p y of t h i s I n f o r m a t i o n ( T r . 1 0 / 2 8 / 8 7 , p . 1 2 1 . 1 2 - 2 5 , p . 1 3 1 .1 -5 ) 
a t t h e t i m e of i n i t i a l p r e s e n t m e n t , t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t a p p o i n t e d 
t h e S a l t Lake L e g a l D e f e n d e r ' s O f f i c e t o r e p r e s e n t A p p e l l a n t . 
(R.4) F r a n c i s P a l a c i o s t h e r e a f t e r e n t e r e d h e r a p p e a r a n c e a s 
c o u n s e l of r e c o r d . (R.8) I m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o t h e p r e l i m i n a r y 
hearing on the 6th day of January, 1984, the State of Utah through 
the Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney filed an Amended Information 
(R.4 and 13) which again charged Appellant with Criminal Homicide, 
Murder, Second Degree under § 76-5-203 (1) (a) and (b), but added, 
in the alternative, that Appellant caused the death of the victim 
by violating subsection (c) of § 76-5-203(1) which provides Ln 
pertinent part: 
76-5-203(1) Criminal Homicide constitutes 
murder in the second degree if the action: 
... (c) acting under circumstances evidencing 
a depraved indifference to human life, by 
engaging in conduct which creates a grave risk 
of death to another and thirty causes the 
death of another. 
Appellant's counsel waived a formal reading of the 
Amended Information (R.4) and Appellant was never provided with a 
copy of the document (R.4 and Tr. 10/28/87, p.13 1.13-25). After 
the Preliminary Hearing, Appellant was bound over as charged to 
stand trial in Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. (R.4) 
Appellant was arraigned in the Third District Court 
before the Honorable Jay E. Banks on January 13, 1984. (R.14) 
Appellant's counsel Francis Palacios was not present at 
arraignment, but Nancy Bergeson, another attorney from the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender's office, appeared in her stead. (R.4) At 
that time Appellant entered a not guilty plea to the Amended 
Information. (R.4) 
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After his arraignment in District Court, and at 
Appellant's request, Francis Palacios withdrew as attorney for 
Appellant (Tr. 10/28/87, p.14 1.8-23). Attorney Linda Carter 
entered her appearance sometime in February, 1984. (R.16) 
From February, 1984 until April 16, 1984, Linda Carter 
met with Appellant in the Salt Lake County Jail four to six times 
to discuss the potential defense of diminished capacity (Tr. 
10/28/87, p.53, 1.25), and the results of her investigation into 
the facts and potential plea bargains (Tr. 10/28/87, p.53-54). 
Counsel also discussed with Appellant the status of two other 
pending criminal investigations (1) an auto theft (2) rape of a 
child or child sexual abuse. (Tr. 10/28/87, p.55, 1.4-16) 
On April 13, 1984, three days prior to trial scheduled 
for April 16, 1984, (R.40) Appellant's trial counsel discovered 
for the first time that the State had filed an Amended Information 
alleging a violation of § 76-5-203 (l)(c) commonly called the 
"Depraved Indifference" section (Tr. 10/28/87, p.57 1.11-16 and 
p.63 1.6-17) Ms. Carter went to the Salt Lake County Jail to 
advise the Appellant of the new allegation, to discuss trial 
strategies and to discuss the possibility of a plea bargain. (tr. 
10/28/87, p.57 1.8-16) Appellant told Ms. Carter that under no 
circumstances would he plead to knowingly or intentionally killing 
his wife (Tr. 10/28/87, p.17 1.9-25 and p.18 1.1-18) but that he 
would "accept a manslaughter or any reduced charge" (Tr. 10/28/87, 
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p.17 1.14). Ms. Carter met with Appellant one more time that 
weekend and explained to him the State would not accept a plea to 
manslaughter, but that he could plead guilty to a homicide on the 
basis that he had caused the death of his wife by having committed 
acts which created a grave risk of death with depraved 
indifference to human life; a plea which would not imply that he 
intentionally or knowingly caused her death, and that this was 
different from Second Degree Murder (Tr. 10/28/87, p.18 1.9-18, 
p.57 1.8-25 and p.58 1.1-11) although it carried the same penalty, 
five years to life in the Utah State Prison and/or a fine of 
$10,000. 
On April 16, 1984, Appellant appeared with his counsel 
before the Honorable Jay Banks and entered a plea to Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a First Degree Felony. 
(R.50, R.69 and Tr. 4/16/84, p.5 1.20) Appellant was subsequently 
sentenced to a term of not less than five years to life in the 
Utah State Prison. (R.69) 
In July, 1987, Appellant filed a pro se motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea in the Third Judicial District Court. 
(R.75) This motion was heard before the Honorable Frank G. Noel 
on the 28th day of October, 1987. (R.104) At that hearing 
Appellant was sworn and testified. Linda Carter, Appellant's 
second attorney was sworn and testified. After the Court heard 
the testimony, reviewed the transcripts of the entry of guilty 
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p l e a b e f o r e J u d g e B a n k s , and r e a d t h e A f f i d a v i t of D e f e n d a n t on 
t h e r e c o r d , and h e a r d a r g u m e n t s of c o u n s e l , t h e C o u r t f ound t h a t 
" d e f e n d a n t knew he was p l e a d i n g g u i l t y t o C r i m i n a l H o m i c i d e , a 
Second Degree Murder" (p. 91) and d i s m i s s e d A p p e l l a n t ' s Mot ion . 
A p p e l l a n t now a p p e a l s t h e d e n i a l of h i s M o t i o n t o 
Withdraw G u i l t y P l e a . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A p p e l l a n t ' s g u i l t y p l e a t o C r i m i n a l Homic ide , Murder in 
t h e F i r s t D e g r e e , was n o t k n o w i n g , i n t e l l i g e n t o r v o l u n t a r y and 
was r e c e i v e d i n v i o l a t i o n of R u l e 1 1 ( e ) of t h e Utah R u l e s of 
C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , § 7 7 - 3 5 - 1 1 ( e ) , U tah Code Ann. ( 1 9 5 3 , a s 
a m e n d e d ) and a l l a p p l i c a b l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s and c a s e 
p r e c e d e n t . 
Judge Noel abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n in deny ing A p p e l l a n t ' s 
Motion t o Withdraw G u i l t y P l e a . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE NOEL ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS PLEA OF GUILTY 
TO CRIMINAL HOMICIDE MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE 
I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a knowing, i n t e l l i g e n t and 
vo lun t a ry p lea of g u i l t y t h a t admits each element of the offense 
and has t h e same e f f e c t and w e i g h t as i f t h e d e f e n d a n t had been 
found g u i l t y a t t r i a l by a ju ry of h i s p e e r s . Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U .S . 2 3 8 , 89 S . C t . 1 7 0 9 , 2 3 1 L . E d . 2 d 274 ( 1 9 6 9 ) 
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S t a t e v, Ga l l egos , 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1987). Since the en t ry 
of a gu i l ty plea i s accomplished without a review of the evidence 
as would be had in t r i a l and because i t involves a waiver of 
s u b s t a n t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , the Court has been gran ted 
s t a tu to ry author i ty to review the facts surrounding the entry of 
the p lea and, if a p p r o p r i a t e , can upon a showing of good cause 
permit defendant to withdraw his previously entered gu i l ty plea. 
Section 77-13-6 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) provides: 
A p lea of not g u i l t y may be withdrawn p r i o r to 
c o n v i c t i o n . a p lea of g u i l t y of no c o n t e s t 
may be w i thdrawn only upon good cause shown 
and with leave of the Court. (emphasis added) 
Withdrawal of a p lea of g u i l t y i s a p r i v i l e g e and not a r i g h t . 
S t a t e v. Hansen, 627 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah, 1981). The g r a n t i n g of a 
motion to withdraw i s w i th in the sound d i s c r e t i o n of the T r i a l 
Court . S t a t e v. Bennet t , 657 P.2d 1353 (Utah, 1983). If the 
record does not demonstrate that a plea of gu i l ty was knowingly, 
i n t e l l i g e n t l y and voluntar i ly made, and the Court refuses to se t 
the p lea a s i d e , then i t has been held t h a t the Court has abused 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah, 
1987). 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, § 75-
35-ll(e), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) sets forth legislative 
criteria designed to insure that guilty pleas have been knowingly 
and intelligently entered. It provides: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a 
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plea of g u i l t y or no c o n t e s t and s h a l l not 
accept such a. p lea u n t i l the cour t has made 
the findings; 
(1) That if the defendant i s not 
r ep re sen ted by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his r ight to counsel and does not 
des i re counsel; 
(2) That the p lea i s v o l u n t a r i l y 
made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
r i g h t s a g a i n s t c o m p u l s o r y s e l f -
i n c r i m i n a t i o n , to a ju ry t r i a l and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court 
the w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t himf and t h a t by 
entering the plea he waives a l l of those 
r i g h t s ; 
(4) That the defendant understands 
the na tu re and e lements of the offense to 
which he i s e n t e r i n g the p l ea ; t h a t upon 
t r i a l the p r o s e c u t i o n would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements 
beyond a r easonable doubt; and t h a t the 
elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence tha t may be 
imposed upon him for each offense to 
which a p lea i s e n t e r e d , inc lud ing the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i m p o s i t i o n of 
consecutive sentences; ;and 
(6) Whether the tendered p lea i s a 
r e s u l t of a p r i o r p lea d i s c u s s i o n and 
plea agreement and if so, what agreement 
has been reached. (Emphases added). 
Though our Rule 11 is patterned after the provisions of 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Cr iminal Procedure , the s p e c i f i c 
requirements are s l i g h t l y d i f fe ren t . Our Rule requires the Court 
to make the a fo re sa id f ind ings wi thout spec i fy ing the manner in 
which the Judge must es tab l i sh the factual basis for his f indings; 
whereas under the Federal Rule the t r i a l cou r t i s s t a t u t o r i l y 
required to "address the defendant personally" to determine if the 
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defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary and to determine if 
there is a factual basis for the plea which would show an adequate 
relationship between defendant's admitted acts and the 
requirements of the law. Despite this procedural difference, the 
rules are similar in that they both require the Court accepting 
the plea to determine the factual basis of the plea vis-a-vis the 
elements of the offense charged, 
Tn McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, 89 
S.Ct. 1166 (1969), the Court reversed the conviction of a 
defendant based upon his plea of guilty because the trial judge 
had failed to strictly comply with the requirements of the Rule 
designed to insure that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The 
Court further ordered that all factors used in assessing the 
voluntariness of the plea must be made a matter of record to aid 
an Appellate Court in its review. 
Later in Boykin v. Alabama, supra, the Supreme Court 
used similar reasoning as in McCarthy, supra, to hold that it was 
plain reversible error for a State Trial Judge to accept a guilty 
plea without "an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and 
voluntary" at 242. The Court, at 243, firmly stated: 
What is at stake for an accused facing death 
or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude 
of which Courts are capable in canvassing the 
matter with the accused to make sure he has a 
full understanding of what the plea connotes 
and of its consequence. When the Judge 
discharges that function, he leaves a record 
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adequate for any review that may be later 
sought..." (Citation omitted). 
Before a guilty plea can be accepted, the Trial Court 
must first afford the defendant all rights founded on McCarthy and 
Boykin, supra, and our Rule 11 and determine, as a matter of fact 
based upon the record, that the defendant received "meaningful 
notice of the true nature of the charges against him, the first 
and most universally recognized requirement of due process." 
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257, 49 
L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). The defendant must further "understand the 
elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of the law to 
the facts. State v Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312, citing with 
approval McCarthy, supra. "There is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating on the record ajt the time the plea is entered the 
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against 
him." McCarthy, at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1172. (Emphasis added) The 
Trial Judge cannot rely upon defense counsel's assertion that the 
defendant fully understands the nature of the charge and the 
elements of the offense M£C.iL£ji.]2Y' £H£££* See also, 
State v. Gibbons, supra. A Trial Judge is permitted to use a 
pre-printed affidavit as a "starting point, not an end point, in 
the pleading process." Gibbons at 1313. However: 
... A sufficient affidavit is one which is 
signed by the defendant, his attorney, the 
prosecutor, and the trial judge and which 
lists the names and the degrees of the crimes 
charged. The affidavit should contain both a. 
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statement of the elements of the offenses and 
£ £2££E£i.£ 9.L tJl£ d e f e n d a n t 1 s ££jt£ t^ha„t 
e s tab l i sh the elements of the crimes charged. 
The a f f i d a v i t shou ld c l e a r l y s t a t e t h e 
a l l owab le punishment for the c r imes charged 
and should note tha t mult iple punishments for 
mult iple crimes may be imposed consecutively. 
The a f f i d a v i t should l i s t i n d i v i d u a l l y and 
spec i f i ca l ly the r igh t s waived by the entry of 
the g u i l t y p l ea . The d e t a i l s of any p lea 
bargain should be set forth in the a f f idav i t , 
as w e l l as a d i s c l a i m e r c o n c e r n i n g any 
sentencing recommendations as required by Rule 
11(e). F inal ly , the a f f idav i t should d isc lose 
the defendant's a b i l i t y to read and understand 
the English language, the absence of promises 
to induce t h e p l e a , and the d e f e n d a n t ' s 
compe tency . The Ji^ jLaJL 2u.d.c[£ £jl££jL<3 jthjaji 
review the s t a t e m e n t s in the a f f i d a v i t wi th 
JLIUL ^£JL££^££*LI . ££££t.A££ Jt h_^  <i£JL££<i££ji 
£££££JL£2L££ ]1JL£ ££il£JL£Ji££^iJl£ £JL AJLL ££fl f u l f i l l the o ther r equ i remen t s imposed by £ 
77-35-11 on the record before accepting the 
guilty plea. (Emphasis added) Gibbons at p. 
1313. 
A c lo se examinat ion of the record in the i n s t a n t case 
r e v e a l s t h a t t he r e was no evidence before Judge Banks when the 
p l e a was t aken nor b e f o r e Judge Noel when he c o n s i d e r e d 
Appellant 's Motion to Withdraw tha t the Appellant understood (1) 
what the State would be required to prove in order to convict him 
of Second Degree Murder inc lud ing the proper e lements of the 
offense or even more importantly (2) tha t he was ever advised that 
the facts he admitted in the Affidavit of Defendant (R.50) do not 
cons t i tu t e the offense of Second Degree Murder. 
POINT II 
DOES THE RECORD SHOW THAT THE APPELLANT 
UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE 
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Appel lant was o r i g i n a l l y charged with Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in t h e Second Degree , in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e d e a t h of 
A p p e l l a n t ' s wi fe in v i o l a t i o n of § 76 -5 -203 (1 ) (a) or (b ) , Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended) which s t a t e s : 
76-5-203 . Murder in the second deg ree . 
(1) Cr iminal homicide c o n s t i t u t e s murder 
in the second degree if the a c t o r : 
(a ) i n t e n t i o n a l l y or k n o w i n g l y 
causes the death of ano ther ; [or] 
(b) i n t e n d i n g t o c a u s e s e r i o u s 
b o d i l y i n j u r y to a n o t h e r , he commits an 
ac t c l e a r l y dangerous to human l i f e t h a t 
causes the death of ano the r ; 
A p p e l l a n t knew t h a t he was cha rged by t h e o r i g i n a l 
in format ion with knowingly or i n t e n t i o n a l l y causing the death of 
h i s w i f e . At a l l t i m e s , A p p e l l a n t has d e n i e d t h a t he engaged in 
i n t e n t i o n a l or knowing behavior . 
P r io r to the P r e l i m i n a r y Hearing an Amended Informat ion 
was f i l e d w h i c h i n c l u d e d t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e o r i g i n a l 
I n f o r m a t i o n t h a t he had c a u s e d t h e d e a t h of h i s w i f e by 
i n t e n t i o n a l or knowing misconduct in v i o l a t i o n of § 76-5-203(1) (a) 
or (b) but which added , in t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t charge t h a t — 
(c) ac t ing under c i r cums tances evidencing a 
d e p r a v e d i n d i f f e r e n c e t o human l i f e , he 
e n g a g e [ d ] in conduc t w i t h c r e a t e [ s 1 a g r a v e 
r i s k of d e a t h t o a n o t h e r and t h e r e b y c a u s e s 
t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r ; in v i o l a t i o n of § 7 6 - 5 -
203( i ) (c ) . Utah Code Ann. (1953 , a s amended) . 
A p p e l l a n t n e v e r r e c e i v e d a copy of t h i s Amended 
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In format ion nor was he advised by the Court of the a l t e r n a t i v e 
charge because his counsel waived a formal reading of the Amended 
Information. Appellant 's second at torney who ass i s ted Appellant 
in p r e p a r a t i o n for t r i a l and u l t i m a t e l y advised him to plead 
gu i l t y was not even aware of the existence of the addit ion of the 
s u b s e c t i o n (c ) , "Depraved I n d i f f e r e n c e " charge u n t i l t h r e e days 
before t r i a l . After counsel discovered the a l t e r n a t i v e charge she 
met with Appel lant two t imes in the S a l t Lake County J a i l . In 
these meet ings Appel lant advised h i s counsel t h a t under no 
circumstances would he plead to in ten t iona l ly or knowingly k i l l i n g 
h i s wi fe . However, because he f e l t mora l ly r e s p o n s i b l e for 
c o n t r i b u t i n g to the death of h i s wife by having f a i l e d to ob t a in 
proper medical t reatment , Appellant advised counsel that he would 
consider pleading gu i l ty to manslaughter or some other charge not 
involv ing "knowing" or " i n t e n t i o n a l " a f f i r m a t i v e a c t s . When 
Appel lan t refused to plead to Second Degree Murder, h i s counsel 
suggested that he could plead gu i l ty to having placed his wife in 
a g r a v e r i s k of d e a t h by f a i l i n g to s e c u r e p r o p e r m e d i c a l 
a t t e n t i o n with depraved i n d i f f e r e n c e to her w e l l - b e i n g . In 
A p p e l l a n t ' s mind h i s p l e a was to s o m e t h i n g l e s s than and 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from knowing or i n t e n t i o n a l murder, 
although conviction of that charge carr ied the same penalty as a 
knowing or i n t e n t i o n a l homicide . In t h i s r e s p e c t i t i s very 
s ign i f i can t that the Affidavit of Defendant (R.50) upon which his 
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plea was based does not refer to the charge by its common name; 
for the phrase "Murder in the Second Degree" does not appear 
thereon. 
When Appellant's case was called before Judge Banks for 
change of plea and after Appellant's counsel made a statement to 
the Court about the plea bargain, the following discussion ensued: 
THE COURT: YOUR NAME IS KERRY R. BORENf 
AND I BELIEVE YOU ARE CHARGED WITH MURDER IN 
THE SECOND DEGREE. 
MS. CARTER: YOUR HONOR, PERHAPS I COULD 
HELP THE COURT. HE IS PLEADING UNDER THE 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE SECTION AND NOT UNDER 
EITHER THE "A" OR "B" SUBSECTION. 
THE COURT: IS THAT AGREEABLE WITH THE 
STATE. 
MR. GUNNARSON: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
( T r . 4 / 1 6 / 8 4 , p . l 1 .18 -24) 
I n t h i s e x c h a n g e , t h e J u d g e h a v i n g b e e n i n f o r m e d t h a t 
A p p e l l a n t w i l l e n t e r a g u i l t y p l e a , a d v i s e d A p p e l l a n t t h a t he was 
cha rged w i t h Second Degree Murder . Ms. C a r t e r t hen c o r r e c t e d t h e 
J u d g e ' s s t a t e m e n t and e x p l a i n e d t h a t A p p e l l a n t ' s p l e a was o n l y 
u n d e r t h e D e p r a v e d I n d i f f e r e n c e s e c t i o n and n o t u n d e r t h e 
i n t e n t i o n a l or k n o w i n g s e c t i o n s of t h e s t a t u t e . The s u g g e s t i o n 
made by t h i s e x c h a n g e i s c l e a r : D e p r a v e d I n d i f f e r e n c e i s a 
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s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t o f f e n s e from knowing or i n t e n t i o n a l m u r d e r . 
A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n f u s i o n o v e r t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c h a r g e t o 
w h i c h he u l t i m a t e l y p l e a d e d was f u r t h e r compounded by Judge Banks 
a t t h e t i m e o f t h e e n t r y o f t h e g u i l t y p l e a w h e n t h e f o l l o w i n g 
e x c h a n g e t o o k p l a c e : 
"MR. BOREN, TO THE CHARGE OF CRIMINAL 
HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, A FIRST 
DEGREE FELONY, AS I HAVE EXPLAINED IT TO YOU, 
WHICH OCCURRED AT 34 EAST MILLER AVENUE IN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON OR ABOUT 
SEPTEMBER 15TH, 1 9 8 3 , IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 
7 6 , CHAPTER 6 , SECTION 2 0 3 , UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1 9 5 3 , AS AMENDED, THAT YOU, KERRY 
R. BOREN — WAIT A MINUTE. I'VE GOT TO GET 
THE AMENDED INFORMATION. CAUSED THE DEATH OF 
E L V I A BOREN - - W H I L E A C T I N G UNDER 
C I R C U M S T A N C E S E V I D E N C I N G A DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE, ENGAGED IN CONDUCT 
WHICH CREATED A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH TO 
ANOTHER, AND THEREBY CAUSED THE DEATH OF ELVIA 
BOREN." 
"WHAT NOW IS YOUR PLEA, GUILTY OR NOT 
GUILTY? MR. BOREN: "GUILTY, YOUR HONOR." 
( T r . 4 / 1 6 / 8 4 , p . 5 1 . 7 - 2 0 ) 
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When taking Appellant's plea Judge Banks mistakenly 
started out by reading the allegations of the original Information 
based on § 76-5-203(l)(a) and (b). He then caught his mistake and 
turned to the Amended Information and began reading to Appellant 
the "Depraved Indifference" language of the Amended Information. 
At no time did Judge Banks correct the failure of the "Affidavit 
of Defendant" to advise the Appellant that by factually admitting 
that his conduct met the "depraved indifference" element of § 76-
5-203(l)(c), he was pleading guilty to Second Degree Murder rather 
than some lesser included offense. 
Because the record does not clearly demonstrate in this 
confusion that Appellant understood the charge to which he plead, 
the plea must be set aside. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD DOES NOT REFLECT THAT APPELLANT UNDERSTOOD 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE TO WHICH HE PLED GUILTY 
Under t h e Utah Code, a p e r s o n commi t s C r i m i n a l Homicide 
i f he " i n t e n t i o n a l l y f knowingly, recklessly, with criminal 
negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in 
the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another 
human being, including an unborn child." § 76-5-203(1) Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended). Based on this general definit ion, the 
code goes on to assign various penalties ranging from one year in 
prison to death for five separate homicide offenses differentiated 
primarily by the mens rea or level of intent of the actor. 
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Sect ion 76-5-202 de f ines Murder in the F i r s t Degree, a c a p i t a l 
o f f ense , as i n t e n t i o n a l l y or knowingly caus ing the death of 
another under s t a t u t o r i l y def ined aggravated c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
Sec t ion 76-5-203, de f ines Second Degree Murder, a f i r s t degree 
felony, as any knowing or in ten t iona l homicide committed without 
the aggravating circumstances l i s t e d in § 76-5-202. Section 76-5-
205, provides that Reckless homicides, those committed by persons 
who mis taken ly b e l i e v e t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s are j u s t i f i e d , and 
k i l l i n g s commi t t ed by p e r s o n s under e x t r e m e d i s t r e s s ace 
Manslaughter , a second degree fe lony. Under s e c t i o n 76-5-206, 
h o m i c i d e s a t t r i b u t a b l e to the n e g l i g e n c e of t h e a c t o r a r e 
"neg l i gen t . " F i n a l l y , § 76-5-207 p rov ides t h a t Automobile 
Homicide (causing the death of another by ope ra t i ng a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol) as a th i rd 
degree felony if the death resul ted by conduct which amounted to 
s imple n e g l i g e n c e , but i s a second degree felony if the a c t o r ' s 
conduct was cr iminal ly negligent . In each of these s t a t u t e s , the 
sever i ty of the penalty i s d i r e c t l y proport ional to the degree of 
mens rea with which the perpet ra tor acted. 
In t h i s s t a tu to ry scheme, Section 76-5-203(1) (c) stands 
ou t as anomaly b e c a u s e though i t r e q u i r e s conduc t which 
object ively manifests "depraved indifference to human l i f e " . I t 
in no way s p e c i f i e s the s u b j e c t i v e mental s t a t e with which the 
a l l eged p e r p e t r a t o r i s r equ i red to have acted in order to be 
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convicted of Second Degree Murder. After some years of confusion, 
this court resolved the question in State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1042 (Utah, 1984). In that case, Fontana, an experienced marksman 
was convicted by a jury of Second Degree Murder under § 76-5-
203(l)(c) after admitting that he had "dry fired" his .357 magnum 
pistol directly at the driver of a vehicle stopped next to his. 
He appealed, claiming that his conviction was in error because the 
jury was not instructed that it could not find him guilty of 
Second Degree Murder unless it found that he knowingly or 
intentionally caused the death of the victim. While this Court 
affirmed his conviction on the basis that the failure to include a 
specific mens rea instruction was harmless in light of other 
evidence in that case and the other jury instructions, the Court 
held that mens r e a is a required element of the "Depraved 
Indifference" provision of § 76-5-203(1) (c) at 680 P.2d 1047. The 
Court further held that conviction under that section requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the following elements: 
1. The defendant engaged in conduct that 
created a grave risk of death to another; and 
2. A_t the time he so acted, the defendant 
knew that his conduct created a_ grave risk of 
death to another; and 
3. The circumstances under which the 
defendant acted, objectively viewed by a 
reasonable man rather than subjectively by the 
actual state of defendant's mind, were such as 
to evidence a depraved indifference to human 
life; and 
4. The defendant thereby unlawfully caused 
the death of another. (Emphasis added), at 
1047 
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Neither in the Affidavit of Defendant nor in the 
colloquy between Judge Banks and the Appellant at the time he 
entered his plea, is there a single word advising Appellant that 
he was not guilty of Second Degree Murder under § 76-5-203(1) (c) 
as charged in the Amended Information, unless at the time of the 
incident Appellant knew that his conduct created a, grave risk of 
death to [his wife]. See Fontana, supra. 
This failure is fatal to Appellant's plea of guilty; for 
it is clearly manifest that a man cannot "knowingly and 
intentionally" concede his guilt of an offense unless he has been 
competently advised of the elements of that offense. See Boykiny 
supra. In light of the tandem failure of Appellant's counsel and 
the trial judge to correctly advise him of the elements of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty, this Court must set aside his 
guilty plea and remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings on the Amended Information. 
POINT IV 
THE FACTS ADMITTED BY APPELLANT DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
THE CRIME OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
As was eloquently stated in McCarthy, supra, at 467, 
before he accepts a guilty plea — 
The judge must de te rmine t h a t the conduct 
which t h e d e f e n d a n t a d m i t s c o n s t i t u t e s t h e 
o f f e n s e c h a r g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t o r 
in format ion or an offense included t h e r e i n to 
w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s p l e a d e d g u i l t y . " 
Requ i r ing t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n 
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between the law and the acts the defendant 
"protect a defendant who is in the position of 
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of 
the nature of the charge but without realizing 
that his conduct does not actually fall within 
the charge." (Emphasis added). 
The Supreme could not have described the constitutional 
and statutory error committed by the Trial Court in this case with 
more exquisite precision had it been present en_ banc to view the 
proceedings before Judge Noel. 
On the factsf the error is as follows. Section 76-5-
203(l)(c) requires some form of proof that Appellant knew his 
conduct (omissive or comissive) created a grave risk of death to 
his wife. 
The "Facts" section of the Affidavit of Defendant was 
the only evidence before the Court which set forth the facts 
Appellant admitted. There is nothing in that brief recitation to 
suggest that Appellant knew (or should have known) that his 
conduct created a risk of death to his wife. 
On the contrary, as phrased in his Affidavit, 
Appellant's failure to provide appropriate treatment for his wife 
which created a grave risk of death, could have been negligent, 
reckless or completely innocent of criminal intent. Appellant's 
testimony before Judge Noel to the effect that he did not know 
that he was pleading guilty to a knowing homicide and the 
testimony of his counsel that he consistently denied having acted 
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with that state of mind is clear evidence that the facts recited 
do not constitute the crime of Second Degree murder and that 
Appellant did not understand the relationship between the facts he 
admitted and the elements of the offense to which he pleaded 
guilty. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT ENTERED HIS GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 
Any person who stands accused of a crime in Utah has a 
right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution to the 
advice and assistance of competent legal counsel at all critical 
stages of the proceedings. Gideon v. Wainwrightf 372 U.S. 335, 
835 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). This right 
guarantees that an accused clearly understands the nature of the 
charge brought against him, elements of the charge each of which 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the quality and quantity 
of the evidence both for and against him, and the options 
available to him. Unless an accused has competent legal advice, 
other substantial Constitutional rights including the right to a 
fair trial, the right to see and cross examine the witnesses 
against him, the right to present witnesses in his own behalf, the 
privilege against self incrimination, and the right to be 
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acquitted unless the charge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
are rendered meaningless. 
The right to counsel plays a critical role in 
the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth 
Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and 
knowledge is necessary to accord defendants 
the "ample opportunity to meet the case of the 
prosecution" to which they are entitled, 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, at 
685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
Appellant had the right to competent legal counsel at 
all critical stages of the proceedings to assist him in making 
intelligent, informed decisions concerning his defense. Counsel's 
failure to adequately explain to Appellant that his guilty plea to 
Murder based on "Depraved Indifference" to human life was the same 
as admitting his guilt to knowing murder, especially when counsel 
was fully aware of Appellant's adamant refusal to admit that he 
was guilty of knowing misconduct, falls squarely within the 
standard of ineffectiveness and materiality recently enunciated by 
the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, supra. 
In that case, the Supreme Court said that to reverse a 
conviction upon an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a 
defendant must show first that his "counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 
Strickland v. Washington, at 687. Further: 
... a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness 
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c l a i m must judge the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of 
counse l ' s cha l lenged conduct on the f a c t s of 
the pa r t i cu la r case, viewed as of the time of 
counse l ' s conduct . A convic ted defendant 
making a claim of ineffect ive ass is tance must 
identify the acts or omissions of counsel tha t 
a re a l l eged not to have been the r e s u l t of 
reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment. The cour t 
must then de te rmine whether , in l i g h t of a l l 
the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the i d e n t i f i e d a c t s or 
omiss ions were o u t s i d e the wide range of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l l y c o m p e t e n t a s s i s t a n c e . In 
making t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n , the cour t should 
keep in mind t h a t c o u n s e l ' s f u n c t i o n , i s 
e l a b o r a t e d in p r e v a i l i n g profess ional norms, 
i s to make the a d v e r s a r i a l t e s t i n g process 
work in the p a r t i c u l a r case . At the same 
time, the court should recognize tha t counsel 
is s trongly presumed to have rendered adequate 
ass is tance and made a l l s ign i f i can t decis ions 
in the e x e r c i s e of r easonab le p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment. a t 690 
S i g n i f i c a n t to the C o u r t ' s r e v i e w of c o u n s e l ' s 
competency is that fact tha t counsel did not know that Appellant 
was charged under the "Depraved Indifference" sect ion un t i l three 
days before t r i a l . 
Before the discovery of the new charge, counsel prepared 
her defense upon the assumpt ions t h a t the S t a t e would have to 
prove t h a t Appel lant committed an a f f i r m a t i v e ac t in tend ing to 
k i l l or s e r i o u s l y i n ju r e the v i c t i m . This prepared defense did 
not conce ivably address the newly d i scovered theory of g u i l t 
con ta ined in the Amended Informat ion because the change t h a t 
a p p e l l a n t acted (under the f a c t s of t h i s c a se , f a i l e d to ac t ) 
knowing t h a t he c r ea t ed a grave r i s k of dea th . To defend t h a t 
a l l e g a t i o n , Appe l l an t ' s counsel would have had to be prepared to 
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address whether Appel lant f a i l e d to provide proper care and 
treatment to his wife, whether t h i s f a i lu re evidenced Appellant's 
depraved i n d i f f e r e n c e to h i s wi fe ' s l i f e ; whether the f a i l u r e 
c r ea t ed a grave r i s k of death and whether Appel lant knew h i s 
act ions created th i s r i sk . 
Because c o u n s e l had so l i t t l e t i m e (1-2 days) to 
consider the new a l lega t ions she could not possibly competently or 
knowingly advise her c l i e n t . In a murder case involving a 
p o t e n t i a l l i f e s e n t e n c e , a l awyer who f a i l s to r ev i ew t h e 
pleadings f i led with the Court and as the r e su l t remains unaware 
un t i l three days before the t r i a l of an Amended Information which 
had been f i l e d with the Court for t h r ee months and which added a 
new theory of g u i l t i s not competent to advise an accused to plead 
gu i l ty to the newly discovered charge. 
With the time l imi t a t i ons counsel was operating under in 
t h i s c a se , i t i s doubtful t h a t she had the t ime to r e sea rch the 
case law to find the mens rea element miss ing in the s t a t u t e but 
described in Fontana, supra, and to pass tha t c r i t i c a l information 
to Appe l lan t . Nowhere in counse l ' s t es t imony does she say she 
researched the s t a t u t e . Nowhere does she say tha t she knew of the 
Cour t ' s d e c i s i o n in Fontana. Nowhere in the record does counsel 
t e s t i f y that she advised Appellant of the importance of Fontana, 
to h i s defense . The reasonable in fe rence from t h i s i s t h a t 
counsel did not advise Appellant of the mens rea required to prove 
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the offense. The only evidence to the contrary is counsel's 
testimony that when she explained the plea bargain to Appellant, 
she tried to "... describe what [depraved indifference] meant as 
opposed to intentionally and knowingly causing the death." (Tr. 
4/16/84, p. 58.) Her failure to be aware of the new change in the 
Amended Information and accurately describe the elements of § 76-
5-203(l)(c) set forth therein constituted clear failures to 
discharge her "overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause 
and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on 
important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of 
important developments in the course of the prosecution." See 
Strickland, supra at 466 U.S. p. 688. These failures deprived 
Appellant of the effective assistance of counsel to which he is 
entitled under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and Article I Section 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah. 
POINT VI 
JUDGE NOEL'S FAILURE TO FIND GOOD CAUSE TO GRANT 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA UNDER THE 
STANDARDS OF BOYKIN AND GIBBONS WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
The Courts in Boykin and Gibbons, supra, held that it 
was not only essential to a guilty plea that the accused clearly 
understand the nature of the charges he is pleading to, but also 
indicated that the responsibility for determining that the accused 
possesses that understanding and demonstrating it in the record at 
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t h e t i m e t h e p l e a i s e n t e r e d l i e s w i t h t h e t r i a l C o u r t . In 
r e v i e w i n g t h e r e c o r d of t h i s c a s e , Judge Noel f a i l e d t o d i s c h a r g e 
t h i s d u t y and w a s c o n t e n t t o r e l y u p o n t h e t e s t i m o n y of 
A p p e l l a n t ' s p r i o r c o u n s e l a s t o h e r h a b i t i n t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s t o 
d e t e r m i n e t h a t when he e n t e r e d h i s g u i l t y p l e a b e f o r e Judge Banks , 
A p p e l l a n t was a d e q u a t e l y in fo rmed and u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e of t h e 
c h a r g e s t h a t he w a s p l e a d i n g t o and t h e f a c t s a d m i t t e d by 
a p p e l l a n t w e r e s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a c c e p t i n g t h e p l e a . T h a t 
f a i l u r e was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r for t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h above . 
CONCLUSION 
The r e c o r d w h i c h was u s e d a s a b a s i s f o r t h e d e c i s i o n of 
t h e Cour t below d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t A p p e l l a n t was confused a s t o t h e 
n a t u r e o f t h e c h a r g e t h a t h i s g u i l t y p l e a c o n c e r n e d . I t 
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t he was a d a m a n t l y opposed t o a g u i l t y p l e a t o any 
i n t e n t i o n a l or knowing m i s c o n d u c t in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e d e a t h of 
h i s w i f e , e v i d e n c e d by h i s o r i g i n a l p l e a of n o t g u i l t y and h i s 
i n t e n t t o go t o t r i a l . The r e c o r d d o e s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e 
C o u r t w h i c h a c c e p t e d h i s p l e a f u l f i l l e d i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o 
a s c e r t a i n t h a t A p p e l l a n t c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e of t h e 
c h a r g e he was p l e a d i n g t o no r t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e o f f e n s e no r t o 
d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t c l a r i t y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g in t h e r e c o r d . I n d e e d , 
t h e C o u r t ' s i n a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a i l u r e of A p p e l l a n t ' s f a c t u a l 
a d m i s s i o n to meet t he e l e m e n t s of S e c t i o n 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 3 ( l ) ( c ) was t h e 
e v e n t t h a t e n a b l e d t h e m i s t a k e t o go u n d e t e c t e d . Had t h e C o u r t 
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read the Amended Information in its entirety to Appellant at the 
time of the entry of his plea and explained the meji£ £e£ 
implications of his pleaf Appellant would have been able to 
understand that the plea he was entering was to knowing 
participation in the death of his wife and not some lesser 
offense. The record does not support the failure of the Court 
below to set aside this plea; and Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse that decision, set aside the plea, and 
remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings on 
the amended information. 
•K 
DATED thi s If—3a y of January, 1989 
IC^ HN/IE'L. MOWER 
attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this // ^ day of January, 1989. 
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